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Abstract 
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) play an important role in enabling poor households 
to escape poverty. MFIs cannot help borrowers if their own performance is poor. This 
study evaluates financial performance of Village Funds (VFs) and Saving Groups for 
Production (SGPs) to determine how well the MFIs are performing financially and 
how to improve the institutions’ future performances. The study evaluates MFIs’ per-
formance, including MFI characteristics, outreach, productivity, financial structure 
and financial performance. Data are collected from the annual reports of MFIs be-
tween 2014 and 2016. VF and SGP annual reports were collected by the Government 
Savings Bank between 2014 and 2016. Data are analyzed using descriptive statistics, 
such as means, to compare the VFs’ and SGPs’ performance. The result shows that 
SGPs are bigger than VFs in terms of the average number of members and borrow-
ers. However, VFs provide more loans than SGPs to poorer clients. In terms of loan 
management, SGP staff are more efficient than VF staff. SGPs’ profits are significantly 
higher than VFs’ profits. In the context of financial structure, SGPs are funded through 
member deposits, while VFs receive government subsidies. The results indicate that 
both VFs and SGPs are profitable and financially sustainable.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past six decades, Thailand has been developing its economy 
based on national and social-development plans. These plans enhanced 
economic growth by supporting the manufacturing industry, with the 
aim of increasing exports. As a result, the Thai economy has been one 
of the fastest growing economies in the world; GDP grew 10% per year 
in the 1990s (Warr, 2000). Between 1988 and 2017, the poverty rate dra-
matically declined from 65.17% of the population, or 34.2 million peo-
ple, to 7.9%, or 5.47 million people (ADB, 2019; NESDB, 2015; Warr, 
2011). However, income inequality remains a significant problem in 
Thailand. The Gini index shows that income inequality in Thailand is 
the highest in Southeast Asia (Bird, Hattel, Sasaki, & Attapich, 2011). 
The index changes between 1988 and 2017 from 0.487 to 0.365, despite 
a declining poverty rate over the period (WBG, 2019).
The Thailand Twelfth National Economic and Social Development Plan 
(12th NESDP), established in 2017 over a five-year period, shows the 
overall development vision linked to the vision of the 20-year national 
strategy (2017–2036). The plan shows that the development of microfi-
nance institutions (MFIs) is considered important to achieve inequality 
alleviation. MFIs play a vital role in helping the poor escape poverty. 
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Although microfinance programs play an important role in improving well-being of borrowers, MFIs 
cannot help borrowers if their own performance is poor. 
This paper evaluates VFs’ and SGPs’ financial performance to determine how well MFIs are doing finan-
cially and how to improve the institutions’ future performances. The rest of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 1 describes microfinance institutions in Thailand. Section 2 provides the literature review. 
Section 3 describes methodology and data. Section 4 provides results. Section 5 provides the discussion 
of the empirical findings. The last section concludes the study.
1. MICROFINANCE 
INSTITUTIONS (MFIs) IN 
THAILAND 
MFIs in Thailand can be divided into three main 
groups (Bird, Hattel, Sasaki, & Attapich, 2011). The 
first group includes formal MFIs, such as banks 
and nonbanking institutions that are regulated 
by prudential regulations. This group consists of 
commercial banks and special financial institu-
tions (SFIs). The second group consists of semi-for-
mal MFIs, which are not regulated by prudential 
regulations. However, these institutions still have 
legal status (Tambunlertchai, 2015). The second 
group includes cooperatives, Saving Groups for 
Production (SGPs) and Village Funds (VFs). The 
last group includes informal MFIs, which are not 
established or regulated by government legisla-
tion. This group is smaller than the formal and 
semi-formal groups. They are often saving groups, 
which operate at the village level (Bird, Hattel, 
Sasaki, & Attapich, 2011; Tambunlertchai, 2015).
Studies have shown that, in Thailand, most low-in-
come and poor people can access financial servic-
es from community-based MFIs, such as VFs, co-
operatives, and SGPs (ADB, 2013; Suwaruchiporn, 
2016). ADB (2013) reveals that over 50% of VF 
borrowers and 40% of SGP borrowers have aver-
age incomes of less than THB 6,000 per month. 
Therefore, these Thai MFIs can ultimately help 
them escape poverty. This study focuses on VFs 
and SGPs.
1.1. Village Funds (VFs) 
The VF program, the largest government microfi-
nance program in Thailand, was established by the 
government in 2001. The Thai government provid-
ed THB 1 million (about USD 22,500 at USD 1 = 
THB 44.5 in 2001) per village, to more than 77,000 
villages and urban communities across the coun-
try (Fongthong & Suriya, 2014). After the general 
election in 2011, the government increased fund-
ing to THB 2 million (about USD 65,800 at USD 
1 = THB 30.4 in 2011) per village. VF plays an im-
portant role in the credit market in Thailand, es-
pecially for the poor who live in rural areas and 
who are often unable to access formal financial 
services (Fongthong & Suriya, 2014).
1.2. Saving Groups  
for Production (SGPs) 
SGPs were established in 1974 by community lead-
ers to encourage members to save. SGPs involve 
gathering people with different status in the village 
to help each other to solve their investment prob-
lems (Luxchaigul, 2014). The local people regularly 
save money in their cash pool. Savings are the best 
way for fund accumulation (Luxchaigul, 2014). 
SGPs’ economic activities begin with savings for 
welfare provision and loans. Borrowers obtain 
loans to invest in their businesses (Luxchaigul, 
2014). SGPs also provide loans to improve liveli-
hoods of their members and to deal with emer-
gencies. SGPs play an important role in providing 
microfinance services to the poor (Meagher, 2013).
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
MFI performance assessment involves evaluating 
progress and determining if an MFI has achieved 
its goals. The most important goal of MFIs is to 
improve the living standard of the poor and to 
eradicate poverty. 
Evaluating MFI performance can be accom-
plished based on three criteria, which are referred 
to as the triangle of microfinance (Zeller & Meyer, 
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2002). These criteria are outreach, financial sus-
tainability and welfare impact. Outreach refers to 
the total number of poor, including the total num-
ber of women, who are served by microfinance 
programs (Mokhtar, 2011). This criterion means 
that microfinance programs can reach the poor-
est with a variety of financial services. Financial 
sustainability is measured using 11 financial per-
formance indicators, such as portfolio at risk, the 
provision expense ratio, the risk coverage ratio, the 
write-off ratio, the operational expense ratio, cost 
per client, personnel productivity, credit officer 
productivity, the funding expense ratio, the cost 
of funds ratio, and loan loss reserves (Mokhtar, 
2011). The welfare impact is measured by the ben-
efits borrowers gain from the program. This meas-
urement is essential in determining the success of 
a microfinance program. Welfare information is 
used by donors and governments to justify their 
investment in the program. 
Many researchers measure MFI perfor-
mance using only a welfare perspective impact 
(e.g., Coleman, 1999; Pitt & Khandker, 1998; 
Setboonsarng & Parpiev, 2008; Swain & Floro, 
2012). Some researchers focus solely on outreach 
(e.g., Navajas, Schreiner, Meyer, Gonzalez-Vega, & 
Rodriguemeza, 2000). Others examine both out-
reach and financial performance (e.g., Bhuiyan, 
Siwar, Ismail, & Talib, 2011; Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, 
& Morduch, 2007; Kereta, 2007; Quayes, 2015). 
This study focuses on Thailand VFs’ and SGPs’ 
outreach and financial performance. 
Agarwal and Sinha (2010) analyze MFI financial 
performance in India using six parameters of fi-
nancial performance, such as financial structure, 
revenue, expenses, efficiency, productivity, and 
risk. These parameters are comprehensive and are 
globally accepted indicators of MFI financial per-
formance (Agarwal & Sinha, 2010). Agarwal and 
Sinha also use financial performance to capture 
the holistic picture of MFI performance. Financial 
performance is defined as whether an MFI is prof-
itable enough to maintain and expand its services 
without subsidies (Rosenberg, 2009). This means 
financial performance contributes to financial 
sustainability of MFIs (Eur-U-Sa, 2011). Financial 
performance covers three ratios: return on assets 
(ROA), return on equity (ROE) and operational 
self-sufficiency (OSS). MFIs are profitable and sus-
tainable if they exhibit positive ROA and ROE and 
have an OSS value over 100% (Bassem, 2012). OSS 
ratio shows whether operating income is enough 
to cover operating costs, including salaries, loan 
losses and other administrative costs (Arthur, 
Abanis, Eliab, & Sumil, 2013). An OSS ratio over 
100% means that MFIs can run their business 
without funding or subsidies from external sourc-
es (Schäfer & Fukasawa, 2011). 
The current study focuses on outreach and finan-
cial performance and investigates the performance 
of VFs and SGPs. It compares both VFs’ and SGPs’ 
performance in terms of institutional character-
istics, outreach, productivity, financial structure 
and financial performance in a similar manner to 
Agarwal and Sinha (2010), Bhuiyan, Siwar, Ismail, 
and Talib (2011) and Rahman and Mazlan (2014). 
This study compares institutional characteristics, 
outreach, productivity, financial structure and fi-
nancial performance of VFs and SGPs in Thailand 
using the performance indicators and ratios of fi-
nancial structure shown in Table 1. There are five 
financial structure ratios used in this study. They 
are capital per asset ratio, debt per equity (%), de-
posit per loans (%), deposits per total assets (%), 
and gross loan portfolio per assets (%). The capi-
tal per asset ratio is used to evaluate MFI solvency. 
This variable shows an MFI’s ability to meet its ob-
ligations and absorb unexpected losses (Yenesew, 
2014). Yenesew (2014) states that the determina-
tion of an acceptable ratio level is generally based 
on an MFI assessment: expected losses, financial 
strength, and ability to absorb losses. This means 
that the ratio measures the amount of capital re-
quired to cover unexpected losses. This study uses 
capital per asset ratio as a proxy for MFIs’ capital. 
Thus, if an MFI has higher capital per asset ratio, 
it is safer than lower ratio institutions. Daher and 
Le Saout (2015) analyzed a global dataset from 
2005 to 2011 and identified those MFIs that had 
high capital to assets ratio and financially out-
performed. Using a panel data set of 210 African 
microfinance institutions, Muriu (2011) finds that 
that capital adequacy has significant positive asso-
ciation with MFI profitability. 
The debt per equity ratio is measured by divid-
ing total liability by total equity. Total liability in-
cludes all the debt that an MFI owes, such as de-
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posits, borrowings, and other liability accounts. 
This ratio is the simplest indication of capital ad-
equacy, since the ratio reflects an MFI’s overall 
leverage (Yenesew, 2014). Muriu (2011) evaluates 
MFIs’ profitability in 32 countries. The author as-
serts that if MFIs employ more debt in their capi-
tal structure, these institutions can increase their 
profits. Muriu also shows that a higher debt per 
equity ratio can improve ROE. Dissanayake (2012) 
investigates factors affecting MFIs’ profitability in 
Sri Lanka. The author finds that the debt to equity 
ratio is negative but is statistically insignificant in 
relation to MFIs’ performance.
The deposit per loan ratio indicates self-sufficien-
cy and an institution’s ability to mobilize sav-
ings (Eur-U-Sa, 2011). Eur-U-Sa (2011) evaluates 
the performance of the Bank of Agriculture and 
Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) in Thailand and 
finds that the deposit per loan ratio of the BAAC 
gradually increased between 1967 and 2009. This 
means that the bank is moving towards becoming 
a self-financing institution. Bhuiyan, Siwar, Ismail, 
and Talib (2011) estimate financial sustainability 
and outreach of MFIs in Malaysia and Bangladesh. 
They find that the deposit per loan ratio of MFIs 
in Malaysia is higher than the ratio in Bangladesh. 
This means that Malaysian MFIs have greater levels 
of self-financing than Bangladeshi MFIs. 
The deposit per total asset ratio is measured by 
dividing total deposits by total assets. This ra-
tio is only relevant for mobilizing MFIs’ depos-
its. If an MFI has an efficient deposit program, 
this ratio will be high. This means that an in-
stitution has low funding costs (Muriu, 2011). 
Muriu explains that external funding is more 
costly than deposits, thus MFIs may effective-
ly use local depositors. However, Rahman and 
Mazlan (2014) find that Bangladeshi MFIs do 
not use deposits as their main source of funds. 
Their main source of funds comes from debt-fi-
nancing, which explains why the debt to equity 
ratio of these MFIs is high. Agarwal and Sinha’s 
(2010) results show that the debt to equity ratio 
of these Indian MFIs is high. This means that 
their main funding is debt.
The gross loan portfolio per asset ratio is measured 
by dividing the gross loan portfolio by total assets. 
This ratio shows the financial structure. The ratio 
indicates the proportion of MFIs’ core earning 
assets. Wassie, Kusakari, and Sumimoto (2019), 
who evaluated Ethiopian MFIs performance, state 
that the gross loan portfolio per asset ratio indi-
cates the management’s ability to allocate resourc-
es to the primary and most profitable activity of 
MFIs – making microloans. Wassie, Kusakari, 
and Sumimoto (2019) find that, on average, the 
MFIs considered in their study devote nearly 70% 
of their assets to their primary purpose of making 
loans. Bhuiyan, Siwar, Ismail, and Talib (2011) use 
this variable to compare the financial structure of 
Malaysian and Bangladeshi MFIs. Their results 
reveal that Malaysia MFIs’ ratio is higher than 
Bangladesh MFIs. Anduanbessa (2009) finds that 
the gross loan portfolio per asset ratio affects MFI 
sustainability.
MFI financial performance consists of ROA, ROE, 
and operational self-sufficiency. ROA is measured 
by dividing net operating income by total assets. 
This variable reflects an MFI’s ability to deploy its 
asset profitably. Nyamsogoro (2010) shows that 
Tanzanian MFIs had a negative return on as-
sets between 2001 and 2002, as these institutions 
were starting businesses in a new environment. 
Therefore, ROA experiences both positive and 
negative values. Tanin, Mobin, Ng, Dewandaru, 
Salim, Nkoba, and Razak (2019) used this ratio 
to evaluate the financial performance of 62 MFIs 
across 34 countries. They find that the mean ROA 
of MFIs is 2.9%, which implies that these MFIs 
are financially sustainable. Agarwal and Sinha 
(2010) used this ratio to evaluate the financial per-
formance of MFIs in India. The authors find that 
MFIs in India are financially sustainable.
ROE is measured by dividing net operating income 
by total equity. ROE reflects the efficiency of opera-
tions and proper portfolio management in relation 
to equity (Nyamsogoro, 2010). This ratio is a cru-
cial indicator for private investors when deciding 
whether to invest in MFIs (Ledgerwood, 1998). 
Duwal (2012) used ROE to measure the operating 
performance of MFIs in Nepal. The author states 
that ROE can be used to measure returns on own-
ers’ investments. The results show that Nepal MFIs 
perform better than the global benchmark. Using 
a sample of 722 MFIs from the period of 2005–
2010, Cozarenco, Hudon, and Szafarz (2016) used 
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Table 1. Institutional characteristics, outreach, productivity, and financial performance measurement 
indicators and ratios
Source: Bhuiyan, Siwar, Ismail, and Talib (2011), Rahman, and Mazlan (2014).
Indicator Ratio or calculation
Institutional characteristics
Age (years) Age of MFI
Personnel (persons) Personnel number 
Profit MFI’s profit
Total assets Total assets of MFI
Total liability Total liability of MFI
Total equity Total equity of MFI
Outreach
The number of members (persons) Number of members
The number of borrowers (persons) Number of borrowers
Average loan balance per borrower (Baht per 
borrower)
Gross Loan Portfolio
Number of Active Borrowers
Productivity
Borrowers per staff member
Number of Active Borrowers
Number of Personnel




Capital per asset ratio
Equity
Assets
Debt per equity (%)
Liabilities
Equity
Deposit per loan (%)
Deposits
Gross Loan Portfolio
Deposits per total assets (%)
Deposits
Assets














Financial Expense Net Impairment Operating Expense+ +
ROE to compare financial performance of deposit- 
and non-deposit-mobilizing MFIs. They find that 
both MFIs are not significantly different in terms 
of financial performance.
OSS is measured by dividing operating income 
by operating expenditure. Meyer (2002) states 
that OSS means that the operating income is suf-
ficient to cover operating costs (such as salaries 
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and wages, supplies, loan losses, and other ad-
ministrative costs). Some studies use OSS to eval-
uate MFI sustainability. Bogan (2012) evaluates 
how changes in capital structure can improve 
financial sustainability based on the operation-
al self-sustainability ratio. The author uses pan-
el data from MFIs in Latin America, Asia, and 
Eastern Europe between 2003 and 2006. Bogan’s 
(2012)  results show that assets and capital struc-
ture affect MFIs’ performance. Asset size is posi-
tive and significantly influenced by sustainability. 
The grant per asset ratio is significant and nega-
tively influenced by sustainability. The relation-
ship between grant per asset and sustainability 
means that MFIs should rely less on grants, soft 
loans, and other types of donor funds. Sekabira 
(2013) investigates the sustainability of 14 MFIs 
in Uganda, based on capital structure. The study 
uses operational self-sustainability and finan-
cial self-sustainability to measure sustainability. 
Sekabira (2013) finds that debt and grants are 
negatively correlated with operational and finan-
cial self-sustainability and that capital structure 
is essential for MFIs’ sustainability. The author 
states that when MFIs increase their debts, they 
struggle to make repayments. Moreover, when 
MFIs receive more grants, operations become 
less competitive because these funds are given 
to borrowers at lower than market interest rates. 
This practice reduces interest revenues and funds 
for future operations.
3. METHODOLOGY  
AND DATA
This study compares both VFs’ and SGPs’ perfor-
mance, including MFI characteristics, outreach, 
productivity, financial structure and financial 
performance. It was not possible to use the latest 
data because the government and the Government 
Savings Bank (GSB) do not currently have a data-
base that contains the most recent data. The data 
were collected from annual reports of MFIs be-
tween 2014 and 2016. VFs’ and SGPs’ annual re-
ports were collected by the GSB between 2014 and 
2016. GSB collected these data through the MFIs 
competition in Thailand. The MFIs competition is 
an annual contest run by the GSB. There are more 
than 100 MFIs in Thailand that participate in this 
contest. This study uses data from 90 VFs and 70 
SGPs in Thailand. The annual reports include the 
total number of members and borrowers, the to-
tal number of staff members, the total cash, loans 
outstanding, assets, liabilities, equity, revenue, ex-
penses, and net profit.
This study uses descriptive statistics to assess VFs’ 
and SGPs’ performance, such as the mean tests 
for comparing the VFs’ and SGPs’ performance. 
Agarwal and Sinha (2010) state that it is good to 
use the difference of means test, if data is too small 
to use rigorous multivariate analysis. Several stud-
ies have used descriptive statistics to evaluate 
MFIs’ performance. Piot-Lepetit and Nzongang 
(2019), who evaluated village banks’ performance 
in Cameroon, use descriptive statistics to explain 
their variables in a Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA). The authors find that village banks in 
Cameroon are efficient. Roy (2011) examines MFIs’ 
profitability in Assam (a state in north-eastern 
India), based on simple correlation and descrip-
tive statistics, and finds that MFIs of Assam en-
joy higher profitability. Kereta (2007) explores the 
outreach and financial performance of Ethiopian 
microfinance institutions based on a simple de-
scriptive analysis and percentage growth rates. 
The author finds that in terms of breadth of out-
reach, MFIs served an increasing number of cli-
ents in each year from 2003–2007. The industry’s 
growth rate in terms of number of clients is 22.9%. 
Agarwal and Sinha (2010), Bhuiyan, Siwar, Ismail, 
and Talib (2011), and Rahman and Mazlan (2014) 
use descriptive analysis to compare the financial 
performance of MFIs. They conclude that MFIs 
are financially sustainable.
4. RESULTS 
4.1. VF and SGP characteristics, 
outreach and productivity
Table 2 shows that the average age of the VF and 
SGP respondents are 13.09 and 10.61 years, respec-
tively. The means of the groups are significantly 
different at the 1% level. SGPs have a higher aver-
age number of members and borrowers than VFs. 
The average number of SGP members and borrow-
ers are 445.54 and 106.72, respectively; VFs have 
an average of 347.38 members and 97.04 borrow-
ers. The number of members for the types of MFIs 
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are significantly different at the 5% level. The aver-
age SGP loan amount per borrower is significantly 
higher at the 5% level than for VFs. The average 
loan for SGPs and VFs is 32,377.61 and 27,008.03 
baht per borrower, respectively (see Table 2). 
The average number of staff members per VF and 
SGP is 10.68 and 11.26 persons, respectively, and 
significantly different at the 5% level. VFs and 
SGPs have similar numbers of borrowers per staff 
member (9.08 and 8.77) (see Table 2). However, 
for SGPs, loans per staff member are significant-
ly higher at the 1% level than for VFs. Total loan 
amounts per staff member for SGPs and VFs are 
288,952.6 and 194,390.7 baht, respectively. In ad-
dition, SGP profits of 118,253.6 baht per year are 
significantly higher at the 1% level than VF profits.
SGPs’ total assets are significantly higher at the 1% 
level, almost double those of VFs (5,513,542 baht 
and 2,576,263 baht, respectively) (see Table 2). 
SGPs have significantly higher (at the 1% lev-
el) liabilities than VFs, approximately 36 times 
(2,861,209 baht and 78,813.04 baht, respectively). 
SGP and VF total equities are similar. The total eq-
uities are 2,693,207 and 2,499,516 baht, respective-
ly (see Table 2). 
4.2. VF and SGP financial structures
This section compares the VFs and SGPs financial 
structures using the capital per asset, debt per equity, 
deposit per loan, and gross loan portfolio per asset 
ratios. The VF capital per asset ratio is significantly 
higher at the 1% level than the SGP. Both the VFs and 
SGPs capital per asset ratios are significantly higher 
than the Global and FSS benchmarks (see Table 3). 
Table 3. Comparison of Thai MFIs’ financial 





VFs SGPs P-value Global FSS
Capital per asset 
ratio 0.98 0.68 0.0000*** 0.2398 0.231
Debt per equity 0.08 3.23 0.0000*** 0.0286 0.033
Deposits per loan 0.01 0.40 0.0000*** 0.1107 0.118
Deposits per total 




0.77 0.64 0.0193** 0.7685 0.784
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively.
Table 2. Institutional characteristics, outreach and productivity of Thai VFs and SGPs (mean values 





Age (years) 13.09 10.61 0.000***
Personnel (persons) 10.68 11.26 0.0334**
Profit (Baht) 112,623.10 230,867.60 0.0000***
Total assets (Baht) 2,576,263.00 5,513,542.00 0.0000***
Total liability (Baht) 78,813.04 2,861,209.00 0.0000***
Total equity (Baht) 2,499,516.00 2,693,207.00 0.4833
Outreach
The number of members (persons) 347.38 445.54 0.0117**
The number of borrowers (persons) 97.04 106.72 0.2950
Average loan balance per borrower (Baht per borrower) 27,008.03 32,377.61 0.0262**
Productivity
Borrowers per staff member 9.08 8.77 0.7308
Loan per staff member 194390.70 288952.60 0.0075***
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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The SGP average debt per equity ratio is above 
the VF average ratio and significantly different at 
the 1% level. Both the VF and SGP average ratios 
are higher than the Global and FSS benchmarks, 
particularly the SGP ratio (see Table 3). The find-
ing shows that SGP profits are significantly high-
er at the 1% level than VF profits, 118,253.60 baht 
per year.
There is a significant difference in the deposit to 
loan ratio of VFs and SGPs at the 1% level. The VF 
deposit per loan ratio is lower than the Global and 
FSS benchmarks, but the SGP ratio is much higher. 
The VF and SGP gross loan portfolio per asset ra-
tios differ significantly at the 5% level but they are 
similar to the Global and FSS benchmarks. 
4.3. VF and SPG financial performance
This section evaluates the financial performance of 
VFs and SGPs based on ROA, ROE, and OSS. Table 
4 compares the financial performance of VFs and 
SGPs between 2014 and 2016. The results show that 
there is a significant difference between the ROAs 
for VFs and SGPs at the 1% level. Both VFs and 
SGPs’ ROA ratios are higher than the Global and 
FSS benchmarks. In terms of ROE, the SGP ratio 
is significantly higher at the 1% level than the VF 
ratio. The SGPs’ average ROE is above the Global 
and FSS benchmarks, while the VFs’ average ROE 
is lower than both benchmarks. Table 4 shows that 
the OSS of VFs is significantly above SGPs at the 
1% level. The OSS of both VFs and SGPs is higher 
than the Global and FSS benchmarks. 
5. DISCUSSION OF 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
This study evaluates the performance of VFs and 
SGPs, including characteristics (such as age, assets, 
total liabilities, total equity), outreach (average 
loan balance per borrower), productivity (num-
bers of borrowers per staff member), financial 
structure and financial performance.
Age refers to the total years that an MFI has been 
in operation (Woldeyes, 2012). According to Kar 
(2012), older MFIs may benefit from organization-
al learning. Organizational learning is learning 
within a specific organization that involves the in-
teraction of multiple levels of analysis (individual, 
group, organizational and inter-organizational). 
The process includes creating, retaining, and trans-
ferring knowledge within an organization. An or-
ganization improves over time as it gains experi-
ence. From this experience, an organization can 
create knowledge (Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011; 
Popova-Nowak & Cseh, 2015). Learning reflects 
productivity and efficiency and how these can be 
improved (Kar, 2012). Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, and 
Morduch (2007) evaluate the financial performance 
and outreach of 124 MFIs in 49 developing coun-
tries. The authors find a positive relationship be-
tween MFI age and sustainability. Robinson (2001) 
explains that experienced MFIs, or those over six 
years old, are 102% financially self-sufficient. Those 
between three and six years old are 86% financial-
ly self-sufficient, whereas those that have been in 
operation for less than three years are only 69% fi-
nancially self-sufficient. This implies that an MFI’s 
age affects its financial sustainability. The result 
suggests that VFs and SGPs benefit from organiza-
tional learning. Lewis, Tambunlertchai, Suesuwan, 
Adair, and Hickson (2013) state that Thailand 
MFIs can use networking to share knowledge and 
experience to improve their performance. The au-
thors suggest that the Community Development 
Department (CDD) encourages SGPs to network at 
the district, provincial and regional levels to share 
their knowledge to improve their performance.
The average loan balance per borrower is meas-
ured using depth of outreach (Ledgerwood, 1998). 
Table 4. A comparison of Thai MFIs’ financial performance (mean values from 2014 to 2016)
Source: Author’s calculations.
Indicator
Financial performance T-test Benchmark
VFs SGPs P-value Global FSS
Return on assets 0.05 0.07 0.0000*** 0.01 0.02
Return on equity 0.06 0.31 0.0000*** 0.07 0.11
Operational self-sufficiency 13.59 2.94 0.0011*** 1.09 1.17
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Smaller loans reflect a poorer client base (Cull, 
Demirguc-Kunt, & Morduch, 2007; Mersland 
& Storm, 2009). Table 2 shows that VFs provide 
more loans to poorer clients than SGPs in terms of 
depth of outreach.
A higher number of borrowers per staff member 
reflects an MFI’s ability to use its staff members 
efficiently. The finding indicates that the efficiency 
of staff member for both MFIs does not differ in 
terms of monitoring borrowers. The loans per staff 
member ratio is used to measure staff productivi-
ty in terms of loan management. Table 2 suggests 
that SGP staff members are more efficient in loan 
management than VF staff members. 
The MFI assets reflect the size of the institution. 
Larger MFIs can benefit from economies of scale 
by reducing operating expenses and therefore 
achieving greater financial performance (Meyer, 
2019). The results suggest that SGPs gain more 
benefit from economies of scale than VFs. SGPs’ 
total assets are significantly higher at the 1% lev-
el, almost double those of VFs. In terms of prof-
it, SGP profits are significantly higher at the 1% 
level than VF profits. In addition, larger MFIs can 
reach more people than smaller MFIs (Mersland 
& Storm, 2009). The result indicates that SGPs can 
reach greater number of borrowers than VFs.
Total liabilities include all deposits, debts, accounts 
payable, and other liability accounts (CGAP, 2003). 
When MFIs take on more debt instruments, effi-
cient liability management and planning are key 
to growing the institutions (Bayai & Ikhide, 2016). 
SGPs were established by community leaders or 
citizen groups to promote savings among mem-
bers, to provide credit to improve members’ lives, 
and to make emergency funds available (Meagher, 
2013). In short, SGPs are funded through member 
deposits. The results suggest that if SGPs manage 
and plan their liabilities efficiently, then they can 
grow more than VFs. However, long-term debts 
are relatively more expensive and, therefore, em-
ploying a high proportion of such debts can lead 
to lower profitability (Kar, 2012). SGPs should be 
concerned about the cost of such liability. 
Total equity is the sum of all equity accounts net of 
any equity distributions, e.g., dividends, stock re-
purchases, or other cash payments made to share-
holders (CGAP, 2003). Equity has an impact on 
MFI performance because equity is cheap, leading 
to higher FSS (Bayai & Ikhide, 2016; Kar, 2012). 
Nyamsogoro (2010) states that equity is a relative-
ly cheap source of funding; equity can improve 
MFI sustainability. VFs derive their equities from 
the government. The programs do not make profit 
from poor people. This makes equity a relatively 
cheap source of finance and, thus, improves their 
financial sustainability. On the other hand, SGPs 
derive their equities from the members in the ru-
ral areas. The local people regularly save money in 
a cash pool. Savings for SGPs are the best way of 
fund accumulation (Luxchaigul, 2014).
In terms of financial structures (the capital per 
asset, debt per equity, deposit per loan, and gross 
loan portfolio per asset ratios), the capital per as-
set ratio is used to evaluate MFIs’ solvency. This 
ratio also shows an MFI’s ability to meet its ob-
ligations and absorb unexpected losses (Yenesew, 
2014). Yenesew (2014) states that the determina-
tion of an acceptable ratio level is generally based 
on an MFI’s assessment measures, which include 
expected losses, financial strength, and the ability 
to absorb losses. This ratio measures the amount 
of capital required to cover unexpected losses. The 
current study uses the capital per asset ratio as a 
proxy for MFI capital. MFIs that have high cap-
ital to assets ratio are financially outperformed 
(Daher & Le Saout, 2015). This means that if an 
MFI has a higher capital per asset ratio, it is saf-
er in terms of ability to meet its obligations and 
absorb unexpected losses than lower ratio institu-
tions. Therefore, both VFs and SGPs are relatively 
safe in terms of financial strength compared with 
the Global and FSS benchmarks.
The results of the average debt per equity ratio in-
dicate that SGPs are saving-based organizations 
(the SGP ratio is much higher than the VF ratio). 
This implies that SGPs have greater creditor risks. 
However, Muriu (2011) concludes that if MFIs em-
ploy more debt in their capital structure, these in-
stitutions can increase their profit.
The deposit to loan is one of the indicators that 
shows financial structure of an MFI. Eur-U-Sa 
(2011) evaluates the performance of the BAAC 
in Thailand. The author finds that the BAAC de-
posit per loan ratio gradually increased between 
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1967 and 2009. This suggests that the BAAC is 
moving towards becoming a self-financing insti-
tution. Muriu (2011) explains that external fund-
ing is more costly than deposits, thus MFIs may 
effectively use local depositors. The result of the 
current study reveals that deposits are the main 
source of funding for SGPs.
The gross loan portfolio per asset ratio is anoth-
er key indicator of financial structure of an MIF. 
This ratio indicates an MFI’s proportion of core 
earning assets. Wassie, Kusakari, and Sumimoto 
(2019) find that, on average, MFIs in Ethiopia de-
vote nearly 70% of their assets to their primary 
purpose of making loans. Rahman and Mazlan 
(2014) and Bhuiyan, Siwar, Ismail, and Talib (2011) 
reveal that core earning assets of MFIs in Malaysia 
and Bangladesh are loans. Mahapatra and Dutta 
(2016) state that the gross loan portfolio acts as 
an indicator of an MFI’s main source of income. 
In short, the bigger the loan, the more interest 
income they will make. The results indicate that 
both VFs and SGPs’ core earning assets are loans.
In terms of financial performance (ROA, ROE, and 
OSS), both VFs and SGPs’ ROA ratios are higher 
than the Global and FSS benchmarks. This result 
indicates that both VFs and SGPs can deploy their 
assets profitably. As Ngo (2012) notes, ROA is used 
to measure profitability in commercial institutions. 
Shkodra (2019) used ROA to evaluate financial per-
formance of MFIs in Kosovo and found that the ROA 
of MFIs in Kosovo was low. It means that MFIs in 
Kosovo are not making enough income from their 
assets. This is not a good sign for the growth of MFIs 
in Kosovo. Agarwal and Sinha (2010) used ROA to 
evaluate the financial performance of India MFIs. 
The authors find that MFIs in India are also finan-
cially sustainable. Wassie, Kusakari, and Sumimoto 
(2019), who evaluate Ethiopian MFIs’ performance 
using ROA, find that they perform well.
The lower VFs’ average ROE is not surprising giv-
en that its equity comes from the government; they 
do not prioritize profits because their core objec-
tive is to assist the poor. VFs play an important 
role in the credit market of Thailand, especially for 
poor individuals who live in rural areas and can-
not access formal financial services (Fongthong 
& Suriya, 2014). The ROE ratio is important on-
ly for profit-earning institutions (Duwal, 2012). 
Ngo (2012) notes that the ROE ratio tends to en-
courage investors to reinvest in MFIs. Likewise, 
Ledgerwood (1998) states that this ratio is a vi-
tal indicator for private investors when deciding 
whether to invest in MFIs. This ratio is the most 
common indicator used to assess financial sus-
tainability of MFIs. Table 4 shows that the average 
ROEs for VFs and SGPs are positive, indicating 
that both are financially sustainable.
OSS measures operating income and operating 
costs, such as salaries and wages, supplies, loan 
losses, and other administrative costs (Meyer, 
2002). Ngo (2012) states that OSS is one indicator 
used to assess the financial sustainability of MFIs. 
Shahzad (2015) uses OSS to measure financial 
sustainability in South Asian MFIs. According to 
Shahzad’s result, OSS can measure MFIs’ finan-
cial sustainability in terms of generating enough 
revenues to cover all financial and operational 
cost. Shkodra (2019) finds that the value of OSS 
above one suggests that MFIs in Kosovo generate 
enough revenues to cover their operating expens-
es. The results indicate that both types of MFIs are 
profitable and financially sustainable.
CONCLUSION
This study compared VFs and SGPs in terms of characteristics, outreach, productivity, financial struc-
ture, and financial performance. It was found that both VFs and SGPs could benefit from organizational 
learning because VFs and SGPs have been operating for an average of 13.09 and 10.61 years, respectively. 
SGPs are bigger than VFs in terms of the average number of members and borrowers. However, VFs 
provide more loans than SGPs to poorer clients. In terms of loan management, SGP staff are more effi-
cient than VF staff. SGPs’ profits are significantly higher than VFs’ profits. 
In terms of financial structure, SGPs are funded through member deposits, while VFs receive govern-
ment subsidies. Both the VFs and SGPs capital per asset ratios are above the Global and FSS bench-
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marks. The result shows that both VFs and SGPs are safe in terms of financial strength. This implies 
that both VFs and SGPs are able to meet their obligations and absorb unexpected losses. The gross loan 
portfolio per asset ratio indicates that both VFs and SGPs have lending as their core earning asset. The 
results indicate that both VFs and SGPs are profitable and financially sustainable. 
To achieve sustainability, both VFs and SGPs should ensure their social and financial goals are ade-
quately balanced. It proposed that both VFs and SGPs use a mixed approach. It is recommended that 
both VFs and SGPs follow profit maximization principles and the government and donors support this 
approach to help them to be sustainable. They should create a robust financial infrastructure to assist 
MFIs to reduce their costs. This will require the participation of information intermediaries to assist 
both VFs and SGPs to reduce their costs, such as credit rating, credit bureaus or credit scoring agencies. 
This study suggests that both VFs and SGPs should embrace technology to minimize their transaction 
costs. They can use management information software and other innovative banking technologies, such 
as internet banking, mobile phone banking, smart card operation, and credit scoring, to minimize 
transaction costs. These technologies can decrease administrative costs, increase staff productivity and 
improve the institution financial accounts’ reliability (Muriu, 2011). Thus, VFs and SGPs adopt modern 
technology to minimize transaction costs. 
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